In this paper, we use both patents' individual life span and foreign patenting activities in Germany to identify the most valuable patents of the 21 most innovative countries (except for Germany) from the European Core, the European periphery and overseas between 1877 and 1932. Our empirical analysis reveals that important characteristics of the international distribution of foreign patents are time-invariant. In particular, the distribution of foreign patents across countries in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was as highly skewed as it was in the late twentieth century -and even dominated by the same major research economies. Our analysis suggests that firms' technological advantages were influenced both by exogenous local factors, such as the countries' resource endowment, and by endogenous factors, such as the national education and research system or the countries' actual stage of economic development.
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Technological transfer and foreign patenting
To analyze the volume, direction, and impact of technological transfer empirically, researchers traditionally rely on international data about bilateral trade flows or FDI. 1 A new approach suggested by Eaton and Kortum, Hafner or Kotabe measures the direction of technological transfer by patenting activities in foreign markets. 2 Given the existence of the respective national patent laws, an inventor can apply for a patent not only in his home country, but also in foreign countries. Getting a patent at home or abroad, however, is not cost-free, but incurs not only the fees of filing and renewing the patent, but also the disclosure of the underlying technological knowledge. Weighting the costs and benefits of foreign patenting, most inventors decide to file a patent only in their home country. Only the most promising inventions will also be patented abroad. Even so, firms will seek patent protection only in those foreign countries where two conditions hold: the potential market for their innovation is large, and the probability of imitation is high. Hence, a foreign patent indicates not only the country of origin, but also the destination of the technological transfer.
Analyzing foreign patenting activities in the late twentieth century, Eaton and Khortum come to the conclusion that "foreign patent applications roughly reflect the scale of research activity in the source country. The United States is the dominant source of foreign patents..., followed by Japan or (in Europe) by Germany." 3 The authors conclude that productivity growth in other countries is driven mainly by the innovation activities of these leading research economies. Hafner, however, raises serious doubts about whether pure patent counts that provide no information about the individual values of foreign patents can also be used to determine the magnitude of the technological transfer. 4 Even though we do not know the particular value of an individual foreign patent, we can be quite sure that foreign patents represent an especially valuable part of a country's patent stock.
That is why many researchers evaluate the technological strengths of a research economy by States in the second half of the twentieth century. 6 They show that, in the late 1980s, Switzerland, Japan (which dramatically improved its position between the 1960s and the 1980s), and Germany were the most innovative countries measured by per capita patenting in the U.S. Sweden, Canada, the Netherlands, Finland, France, the U.K., Denmark, Belgium and
Norway followed in descending order. Foreign patenting activities of developing countries that concentrated mainly on imitation strategies were very small -with the notable exception of Taiwan and South Korea, which began to file a considerable amount of U.S. patents in the 1970s and 1980s respectively. To reveal the patterns of technological specialization, Patel and Pavitt used their data to also calculate an index of revealed technological advantage (RTA) for seventeen OECD countries and eleven technological fields. Switzerland, for example, shows particular innovative strength in fine chemicals, Japan in electronics and automobiles, Germany in chemicals and machinery, Sweden in machinery, and the Netherlands in electronics.
The most comprehensive analysis of the long-term development of the international patterns of technological advantage is provided by Cantwell, who computes the RTA index, again based on foreign patenting in the United States, for sixteen industrialized countries and 27 sectors in the periods 1890-1892, 1910-1912 and 1963-1983. 7 One of his most important findings is that countries that were characterized by comparatively rapid and continuous innovation and productivity growth (such as Japan or Western Germany) strengthened their represents the excellent innovations of the countries of origin better than the set of all foreign patents used in other studies. Our empirical analysis proves that important characteristics of the distribution of foreign patents in the late twentieth century existed one hundred years before and are, therefore, rather time-invariant. First, we show that the distribution of foreign patents across countries in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was as skewed as that of the late twentieth century -and even dominated by the same major research economies. We will also show that this skewness of the distribution of innovativeness repeats itself in the innovative countries in which just a few firms were responsible for the majority of foreign patenting activities. Second, we demonstrate that in the early twentieth century the major research economies often excelled in the same technological fields that they do today.
These findings strongly support Cantwell's view that technological strengths are formed in an accumulative and path-dependent process. In addition, it will become clear that a country's technological advantages are significantly influenced by its resource endowment, its educational and research system, and its actual stage of economic development.
The data
Our observation period begins in 1877, with the establishment of the German patent law of 1877 that gave inventors, for the first time in German history, the opportunity to apply for In the German Empire, patent protection could last up to fifteen years, but not for free. Rather, at the beginning of each year, the patentee had to pay an increasing renewal fee in order to keep his patent in force. 11 Consequently, a patent holder had to decide annually if he wanted to renew his patent for another year. The outcome of this decision depended on the patentee's expectations about the future returns and costs of holding the patent. The latter were determined by the renewal fees which were known in advance. In contrast, the future returns of a patent were highly uncertain and could arise from two major sources. A basic question of this life-span approach is how many years a patent had to be in force to be interpreted as a valuable patent. Figure 1 shows that about seventy percent of all German patents granted between 1891 and 1907 had already been cancelled after just five years. After the fifth year, the speed of patent cancellation was decelerating. About ten percent of all patents were still in force after ten years, and 4.7 percent of all patents reached the maximum age of fifteen years. In the process of developing their historical patent database, Baten and Streb decided to use the cut-off point of ten years to distinguish valuable patents from valueless ones.
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The choice of this cut-off point was not arbitrary. According to the pioneers of this method, the relevant yardstick to distinguish high-value patents from low-value ones lies somewhere between five and 15 years. On the one hand, Pakes observes that, in an early stage of an innovation process, an inventor is often highly uncertain whether his idea can be exploited profitably in the future. 13 The low renewal fees at the beginning of a patent's life allows the inventor to use the patent as a comparatively cheap option that protects the new knowledge and gives him the time to learn more about the invention's technological and economic prospects. As the usually high mortality rates in the early years of a patent cohort indicate, most of the patents turned out to be worthless. Given this fact, it would be conceivable to interpret those patents that survived this learning process and lasted for at least five years as 
Figure 2 Measuring the value of patents
In this paper, we combine two prominent methods to isolate a country's most valuable patents. 17 Figure 2 illustrates our approach. It is clear that domestic patents represent only a subset of all inventions that originated in a particular country. This selection bias is common to (and unavoidable in) all innovation studies that have to rely primarily on patent statistics. In contrast, the problem of pure patent counts stressed by Griliches or Hafner can be considerably reduced. We have explained that a country's most valuable patents can be identified either by their comparatively long life spans or by the fact that they were additionally filed in advanced foreign countries. We use a combination of these two methods in this paper. Our patent data contain, for example, only those patents kept by French innovators that were filed in Germany and held there at least ten years. The studies analyzing foreign patenting in the United States have to examine the whole set of foreign patents because there were no annual renewal fees in use. We can limit our analysis to the smaller intersection of foreign patents and long-lived patents, which we call the set of long-lived foreign patents. As is true today, the distribution of foreign patents across countries was highly skewed. Table 1 shows the most innovative foreign countries in the American and German patent markets for different sub-periods between 1877 and 2001. Note that we do not report American patents held by Americans and German patents held by Germans, respectively, because, as we explained in Section 2, domestic patents are, in general, less valuable than foreign ones. The interaction of the geographical and cultural distance effects discovered by Baten and Jaeger might explain the major differences between the American and the German rankings. Australian and Canadian inventors patented their innovations in the United States rather than in Germany while the opposite was true for inventors from countries such as Austria or Czechia. The most striking feature of Table 1 , however, is the long-term persistence of some countries' technological leadership. The United States (in the German patent market), Germany (in the American patent market), Great Britain (or U.K.), and France dominated foreign patenting activities for more than 120 years. This dominance is not only evident in their consistently high rankings, but also in their comparatively very high number of foreign patents. 22 The only country that was able to join this club of original technological leaders was Japan in the second half of the twentieth century.
In another paper, Baten and Jaeger make the statistical observation that a foreign country's patenting activities in Germany in 1910 had a strong long-run impact on its economic growth measured by GDP per capita in 1960. is probably a good predictor for the scale of German patenting activities in the 1950s, which, in turn, might have determined its growth path after the Second World War. The existence of such long-run effects also implies that a global business history of the twentieth century has to take into account explicitly the development in the nineteenth century. Until now, however, scholars have not presented a conclusive explanation for both the persistent dominance of particular research economies and the highly-skewed distribution of patenting activities across countries. Cantwell suggests that we should explain backward countries' difficulties to achieve the same level of innovativeness as the traditionally dominating research economies by the fact that new technological knowledge is usually generated in an incremental, cumulative and path-dependent process. 24 As the paths of research and development in particular technological fields usually provide no shortcuts for latecomers, the leading research economies are, in general, far ahead of their followers regarding the development of major innovations. We will come back to this hypothesis in the following section. 41 The reader might wonder why the United States displayed technological strengths only in textiles and massconsumption technologies with regard to clothes and shoes. This is not a sign of technological weakness but, rather, the result of the method used. Because of their outstanding German patenting activities, the United States set the standard of comparison for our RTA analysis, which means that the share of this country's patents of a particular technological class among all its German patents (the nominator of equation 1) cannot differ much from this technological class's share in all German patents granted to patentees in all observed foreign countries (the denominator in equation 1). Hence, the American RTAs hardly deviate from one and, consequently, do not often show up in Table A1 in the Appendix.
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1932. Our empirical analysis revealed that important characteristics of the international distribution of foreign patents are time-invariant. In particular, the distribution of foreign patents across countries in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was as highly skewed as it was in the late twentieth century -and even dominated by the same major research economies. This skewness of distribution can also be found in the innovative countries in which just a few firms were responsible for the majority of foreign patenting activities. Our analysis suggests that these firms' technological advantages were influenced both by exogenous local factors, such as the countries' resource endowment, and by endogenous factors, such as the national education and research system or the countries' actual stage of economic development. In addition, the most innovative firms were apparently able to acquire and transfer technological knowledge not only with the help of foreign direct investment, but also through patenting activities. Understanding these firm-level determinants of countries' technological leadership in more detail is one of the most important future challenges for global business historians. 
